Design is an extremely important phase of a Product Liability Prevention Program because it is the only phase where defects can be corrected efficiently and effectively. This Risktopic reviews a design process that uncovers product risks before the start of production so companies can proactively minimize these risks.
INTRODUCTION
The Introduction captures a summary of the document with a focus on the major risk insights and thought leadership issues conveyed to reader. The introduction should explain the issue, why it is important, and what the reader can expect to gain from the document. It is our opportunity to sell the reader that this content is important. Studies have shown that the introduction determines if the document will be utilized. Typically the reader reviews the introduction, makes the determination to read on, and then jumps to the "what to do" section.
The design management process should not be limited to designing products for performance, user specifications, cost and marketing considerations but explicitly consider product safety. These considerations should especially be emphasized beginning with product concept and prototype, field testing through the lifecycle, and ending with product disposal. One often forgotten component of design process is packaging. In some countries, such as in the United States, product liability law defines the product to include the product packaging. Thus, packaging considerations are included in product design and product review.
The following reviews a design process, risk analysis tools, and corrective action steps that can assist the organization in proactively addressing product risks prior to the release to the public.
1) Design process
• Establish a design concept: This is where a designated group or team gathers data from as many relevant sources as possible, including:
-Observations and feedback from marketing and sales personnel.
-Legal and insurance impacts.
-Service/maintenance requirements.
-Who are the foreseeable users?
-What is the foreseeable application?
-What is the foreseeable environment?
-What are the intended use(s) of the product?
-What are the hazards?
-How can the product fail, be misused, mishandled, etc.
-What happens if the product fails?
-Will failure result in loss?
-What is the scope and magnitude of the loss(s)?
Any deviation in terms of non-compliance with Standards and Codes, inability to provide specification machining tolerances, etc. renders the product defective. Designing a margin of safety into a product allows for specification deviations while maintaining product safety.
• Create the product design: The group or team establishes design constraints, such as size, weight, shape, power requirements, material types based on user profile, functional and environmental requirements, etc. The group or team determines the pertinent Standards and Codes, designed degree of reliability, environmental impact, exact specifications, cost of production, etc. Once the product is designed a prototype should be made for testing. At this time specific testing and quality control criteria need to be established and implemented along with production capabilities.
• Review of design: The review helps to identify the ultimate user, user needs, environment for use, and the functions to be performed. Subsequently, the review will help establish performance requirements. The review will also help identify the obvious hazards for both personal injury and property damage. The product review should be based on the combined experience of the group or team.
2) Technics to uncover potential risk during design
Not leaving what could go wrong to guess-work -Hazard Analysis:
Effective hazard analysis during the design phase is very important in identifying the hazards as well as their probability and severity.
Also, it is important to note that there are two types of failures: single point and multi-point. Single point failures include component failures, human error, and/or environmental damage. It is often more challenging for the design team to anticipate the interaction of the above single points of failure. This interaction can result in multipoint failure. For example, a combination of component failure and human error is a multi-point product failure.
• "What if?" Checklist: A good checklist is difficult to design and easy to misuse. A "what if?" checklist for hazard review is not a list of all potential hazards. It is a carefully developed list of hazards determined from an exhaustive study of the prototype of the product, or similar products. The hazard checklist is only complete when all failure means have been identified. Initially the checklist lists all primary failures, such as structural, customer misuses and product abuse. Each of the primary failures details the consequences if it occurs alone or in combination with other hazards. Following the hazard checklist, review the degree of caution and controls necessary for each item on the list to make sure they are established.
• Hazard design analysis: Once a review of the design and the hazard checklist are completed the data can now be analyzed using formal hazard analyses. There are several recognized analytical methods. The results enable the group or team to accurately estimate the costs of product incidents before a production decision is made. Two common hazard analysis methods are used: inductive and the deductive method of logical reasoning. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is one of the most popular inductive logic methods of analysis while Fault Tree Analysis is one of the most popular deductive methods of analysis.
-Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (inductive method) uses observational data to predict what can happen. It considers how the component parts will contribute to the success or failure of the product as a whole. Each component's failure and mode of failure is analyzed. The effect of the hazard that leads to the failure is then traced throughout the product with the evaluation of the ultimate effect on the task performed. The weakness is that only one failure at a time is considered. Thus, some failures may be overlooked. Once the inductive method tells you what can happen a deductive method can determine how something can happen.
-Fault Tree Analysis (deductive method) is a hazard analysis methodology which can postulate the failure of the entire system and identify the components that contribute to the failure. An undesired event is selected, such as fire, and all possible happenings that contribute to a fire are selected. All of the possible happenings are diagrammed in the form of a tree. The branches of the tree are extended until all possible events are reached. Probabilities are then determined for the events. The fault tree depicts the various parallel and sequential combinations of system components that result in the single, selected event or fault. This method is very useful for accident investigations in enabling backward reasoning from the fault to arrive at causal elements. In addition to the two above common methods there is another which has a unique advantage.
-Zurich Hazard Analysis (ZHA) is a modified gross hazard analysis which utilizes inductive and deductive reasoning. ZHA is a very flexible methodology for evaluating products and processes. ZHA allows one to work within the constraints of scope and depth of analysis as well as available time. It uses the collective knowledge of the team with a trained team leader for guiding the analysis. Using a "tickler" list to stimulate thought, the team systematically identifies the hazards in terms of hazardous characteristics, potential malfunction, environmental influences as well as hazards during use, operation, and life cycle stages. The hazards are assessed in terms of potential severity of effects (rated negligible to catastrophic) and probability of occurrence (impossible to frequent). Assessed hazards are defined as "risks." Subsequently, a risk tolerance is established based on company risk policy. Risk tolerance needs to consider societal expectations, regulations, and anything else that could result in unacceptable business impact including litigation. The assessed hazards are plotted on a risk profile grid with the risk tolerance boundary or line dissecting the grid. This diagram allows a visibility of hazard(s). The risks, which fall outside the risk tolerance boundary, are flagged for prioritization for risk reduction. Zurich Hazard Analysis can readily be used during all phases of product development and for any single critical component, entire product, process, or an entire plant.
3) Corrective Actions:
A systematic hazard analysis helps in identifying potential product hazards as well as cause and effect in terms of probability and severity of occurrence. The review process must subsequently consider various alternative measures to prevent or mitigate the hazard(s). The recommended sequence of corrective actions includes:
• Eliminating the hazard through redesign or engineering controls (prevention).
• Guarding through preventing access, containment, and isolation (protection).
• Warnings/instructions (minimization).
• Product safety organizations assure the above measures are maintained and complied. Alternative design can only be implemented after a thorough evaluation of its impact on safety and performance of the product, including the following:
a) Other hazards that may be introduced by the alternative.
b) Their effect on the subsequent usefulness of the product. c) Their effect on the ultimate costs of the product.
d) Technological feasibility of mass producing the product with the alternative design features.
e) Alternative design needs to consider if there are other and safer products available to meet the same needs.
CONCLUSION
Product design should be reviewed for hazards several times during the life cycle of the product. It is recommended that a product go through a three-tiered design review process at pre-selected points or milestones -during the developmental phase or preliminary design review, intermediate design review (IDR), and final design review (FDR). The information contained in this document has been compiled and obtained from sources believed to be reliable and credible but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made by Zurich Insurance Group Ltd. or any of its subsidiaries (hereinafter 'Zurich') as to their accuracy or completeness.
Some of the information contained herein may be time sensitive. Thus, you should consult the most recent referenced material.
Information in this document relates to risk engineering / risk services and is intended as a general description of certain types of services available to qualified customers. It is not intended as, and does not give, an overview of insurance coverages, services or programs and it does not revise or amend any existing insurance contract, offer, quote or other documentation.
Zurich and its employees do not assume any liability of any kind whatsoever, resulting from the use, or reliance upon any information, material or procedure contained herein. Zurich and its employees do not guarantee particular outcomes and there may be conditions on your premises or within your organization which may not be apparent to us. You are in the best position to understand your business and your organization and to take steps to minimize risk, and we wish to assist you by providing the information and tools to assess your changing risk environment.
In the United States of America, risk services are available to qualified customers through Zurich Services Corporation and in Canada through Zurich Risk Services as also in other countries worldwide, risk engineering services are provided by different legal entities affiliated with the Zurich Insurance Group as per the respective country authorization and licensing requirements.
